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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court has consistently held that congressional intent governs
whether federal statutes are privately enforceable.

Where Congress has been

silent, a line of cases culminating in Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002),
prescribes a formula for inferring congressional intent from the structure of a
statute. Here, however, Congress has not been silent: the Food and Nutrition Act
specifies the amount of retroactive benefits that may be awarded households in
“any judicial action arising under this Act” and makes certain records of state
agencies “available for review in any action filed by a household to enforce any
provision of this Act (including regulations issued under this Act)”. This express
authorization of private enforcement obviates the need to determine the availability
of an implied private right of action under Gonzaga. Other provisions of the Act
show that Congress has responded whenever courts called its private enforceability
into question. Provisions of congressional budget process statutes, copious legislative history, the Act’s authoritative administrative construction, and a vast body of
caselaw all confirm the availability of a private right of action.
This Court’s unanimous en banc holding in Victorian v. Miller, 813 F.2d
718 (5th Cir. 1987), that Congress expressly recognized the Act’s private
enforceability, controls this case.

1

ARGUMENT
I.

Congressional Intent Controls the Availability of Private Rights of
Action
Although the Court’s methodology for determining when individuals have

private rights of action has evolved over the years, the ultimate goal of the inquiry
has remained the same: congressional intent. “The initial question before us, then,
is one of statutory construction: Did Congress intend in [the statute] to create
enforceable rights and obligations?” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 15 (1981). “We look first, of course, to the statutory language . . . .
Then we review the legislative history and other traditional aids of statutory
interpretation to determine congressional intent.” Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981).
The Supreme Court has evolved elaborate tests, discussed in detail below,
for inferring congressional about whether a federal statute is privately enforceable
where Congress has been silent. “[T]he recurring question [in these cases is]
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action under a federal statute
without saying so explicitly.” Sea Clammers, at 13. They seek to determine what
“Congress intended to authorize by implication”. Id., at 17.
Even as the Court has become more skeptical of claims of implied private
rights of action, it has continued its focus on “whether Congress ... intended to
create a private right of action”. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002)
2

(quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979)); see
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284 (2001) (“The judicial task is to interpret
the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create
not just a private right but also a private remedy.”); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S.
329, 340-41, 345-47 (1997) (“our inquiry focuses on congressional intent”); Suter
v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 357, 364 (1992) (“we think that Congress did not intend
to create a private remedy for enforcement of” the statute); see Wilder v. Virginia
Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 525-26 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Wright v.
City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 433-34 (1987) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (“We … have reviewed the legislative history of the statute and
other traditional aids of statutory interpretation to determine congressional intent to
create enforceable rights” and finding “nothing to suggest that Congress intended
that [plaintiffs’ claims] be included within the statutory entitlement”).
Where Congress has not addressed the availability of a private right of
action, the Court’s fallback means of ascertaining its intent has been to examine
the clarity of Congress’s specification of the benefits it confers on individuals,
reasoning that if “Congress … intended that the provision in question benefit the
plaintiff," it was more likely to intend to allow judicial enforcement. Gonzaga, at
280; Blessing, at 340-41. This, however, is just a means to the end of “determin[ing] whether Congress intended to create a federal right.” Gonzaga, at 283
3

(emphasis in the original). When the Court has refused to imply a private right of
action under a statute, it has contrasted that statute with those in which it finds
Congress did intend to subject states to suit. Id., at 280-81; Blessing, at 342; Suter,
at 356, 361 n. 12; Pennhurst, at 17-18. In doing so, the Court has searched “in the
Act [and] its legislative history” for evidence “suggest[ing] that Congress intended
to require” recipients of federal funds to honor the claimed right. Pennhurst, at 18;
see Suter, at 362. None of these cases purports to be constitutional: they merely
seek to interpret congressional silence. Pennhurst, at 17-27; Suter, at 360-61. To
the extent that the Court has expressed any substantive concerns about private suits
under a Spending Clause program – that states should be able to know what
financial liability they may face if they participate in the program, see Pennhurst,
at 17 – that is inapplicable here because the federal government pays all awards of
SNAP benefits granted in such litigation. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2013(a), 2019, 2024(d);
Robinson v. Block, 869 F.2d 202, 214 n. 11 (3d Cir. 1988).
As set out below, however, Congress has been far from silent about the
private enforceability of the Food and Nutrition Act. The task of discerning its
intent therefore is fundamentally different from, and easier than, the one the Court
undertook in Gonzaga, Blessing, and their forebears. That line of cases provides
the means of analyzing a statute that “concededly does not explicitly provide any
private remedies whatever.” Trans-America Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
4

11, 18 (1979). The Food and Nutrition Act, by contrast, provides an express
private right of action; a court therefore need not reach the question of whether an
implied private right of action might exist had Congress not spoken. Gonzaga is
particularly adamant about the primacy of congressional intent and the illegitimacy
of substituting “a multi-factor balancing test to pick and choose which federal
requirements may be enforced by § 1983 and which may not.”

Id., at 286.

Applying the factors the Court has identified for discerning the intent of a silent
Congress in preference to respecting Congress’s clearly and repeatedly expressed
intention to allow households’ suits would defy Gonzaga’s warning.
II.

Federal Statutes Expressly Recognize Households’ Right to Judicial
Enforcement of the Food and Nutrition Act and Implementing
Regulations
A.

The Food and Nutrition Act Expressly Provides for Household
Suits
Justice Rehnquist pointed out that, in light of the Court’s decisions prior to

1979 that freely inferred private rights of action under federal statutes, Congress
commonly assumed, rather than expressly creating, such rights prior that time.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring). It therefore should not be surprising that Congress did not see the
need to expressly grant a private right of action in the Food Stamp Act of 1977,
especially after federal courts had entertained myriad recipients’ suits to enforce
the Food Stamp Act of 1964 for a decade.
5

“[T]he traditional rule [is] that the first step in our exposition of a statute
always is to look to the statute's text and to stop there if the text fully reveals its
meaning. There is no apparent reason to deviate from this sound rule when the
question is whether a federal statute confers substantive rights on a § 1983
plaintiff.” Wilder, at 526 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The single most probative
evidence of Congress’s intent to allow private suits to enforce the Act is 7 U.S.C. §
2023(b), enacted in 1981, under the leadership of Senate Agriculture Committee
Chairman Jesse Helms, to codify authority for households’ suits while limiting the
relief available in those actions:
In any judicial action arising under this Act, any allotments found to
have been wrongfully withheld shall be restored only for periods of not more
than one year prior to the date of the commencement of such action, or in the
case of an action seeking review of a final State agency determination, not
more than one year prior to the date of the filing of a request with the State
for the restoration of such allotments or, in either case, not more than one
year prior to the date the State agency is notified or otherwise discovers the
possible loss to a household.
Section 2023(b) serves no other purpose than to authorize suits challenging
misapplication of the Program’s substantive or procedural eligibility requirements
as those errors directly cause “wrongfully withheld” benefits. These provisions
include 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) and (9), establishing the regular and expedited deadlines for application processing: misapplication of those provisions could cause a

6

household to be underissued or wrongfully denied benefits.1 Denying eligible
households a private right of action would render this provision a nullity, violating
the Rule Against Surplusage in statutory construction. Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S.
465, 473 (1997); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979).
Equally clear, 7 U.S.C. § 2020(a)(3)(B)(ii) requires that state SNAP agencies’ records “be available for review in any action filed by a household to enforce
any provision of this Act (including regulations issued under this Act)” subject to
the Act’s privacy protections. As in the case of section 2023(b), Congress’s having
added this language to the Act’s record-keeping requirements in the 2008 Farm
Bill serves no purpose other than to facilitate households’ suits to enforce the Act
and SNAP regulations. See Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 4116 (June 18, 2008), 122 Stat.
1651 (“Farm Bill”). Denying households the right to bring the actions it references
would render the provision, too, a nullity.
Congress has repeatedly amended the Act in response to judicial decisions
limiting households’ access to judicial relief. In 1988, after Cotton v. Mansour,
863 F.2d 1241 (6th Cir. 1988), had limited the scope of relief in households’ suits,
Congress enacted what is now 7 U.S.C. § 2020(b). That section cross-references
the existing authorization for households’ suits in section 2023(b) and requires
1

For example, a state’s failure to comply with section 2020(e)(9) could result in a household
being erroneously denied benefits under 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(f)(1) because it failed to produce required documentation; had the state followed the statute, 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(i)(4)(i)(B) would have
requiring providing the household with benefits once the applicant verified her or his identity.
7

prompt restoration of benefits and broad corrective action whether the deficiency
in state “practices, rules or procedures” was discovered in such suits or otherwise.2
Similarly, three other provisions of the 2008 Farm Bill explicitly reiterated
what Congress had already made clear in sections 2020(a)(3)(B)(ii), 2020(b) and
2023(b): that low-income households may sue to enforce any provisions of the Act
or USDA’s regulations. First, section 4118 overturned Almendarez v. Palmer,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23258 (N.D. Ohio 2002), which found no private right of
action to enforce USDA’s regulations implementing the Act’s provisions on service to people not fluent in English.3 Second, the Farm Bill overturned Reynolds v.
Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2007), which limited states’ accountability for the
actions of local governments administering the Food Stamp Program on their
behalf.4 Finally, the Farm Bill took pains to ensure that USDA’s regulations
implementing major civil rights laws would be judicially enforceable.5

2

The provision’s sponsors identified it as expanding relief in households’ suits to enforce the Act
and USDA’s regulations. 134 Cong. Rec. S11740, S11743 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1988) (statement
of Senate Agriculture Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy); id. at S11746 (statement of Senate
Nutrition Subcommittee Chairman Tom Harkin).
3
The prior statute required states to “use appropriate bilingual personnel and printed material in
the administration of the program in those portions of political subdivisions in the State in which
a substantial number of members of low-income households speak a language other than
English”. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(1)(B) (2006). The Farm Bill struck “use” at the beginning of the
existing provision and inserted “comply with regulations of the Secretary requiring the use of'”.
4
Section 4116 amended section 7 U.S.C. § 2020(a)(2) to provide that: “The responsibility of the
agency of the State government shall not be affected by whether the program is operated on a
State-administered or county-administered basis, as provided under section 2012(t)(1).”
5
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001), held that because private rights of action
must be traced to congressional intent, private individuals could only sue to enforce regulations
when Congress so intended. Section 4117 amended the Food and Nutrition Act’s civil rights
8

In overruling the only food stamp cases finding no private right of action
that had not previously been overruled by the courts themselves, Congress made its
intent that the Act be privately enforceable unmistakably clear. As nothing in
Gonzaga and its forebears authorizes the courts to disregard the intent of Congress,
this judgment is binding on the federal courts. No case has found the absence of a
private right of action in the face of congressional action reversing cases denying
private enforceability.
More broadly, the Act’s clear language, including entitlement language
similar to that found enforceable in other statutes, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968); compare 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) with 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) (1994) (repealed in
1996), has established SNAP benefits as “a matter of statutory entitlement for
persons qualified to receive them … appropriately treated as a form of ‘property’".
Victorian v. Miller, 813 F.2d 718, 721, 723-24 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (quoting
Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985)). Although the Court has entertained

protections to make enforceable the regulations implementing the Age Discrimination Act,
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. By their terms, these laws already govern federal programs such as
SNAP. The import of this change, then, was that it described the implementing regulations
under these laws as creating “rights” for households. The new language follows the formulas
from Gonzaga and Sandoval, demonstrating congressional intent and including explicit rightscreating language, here applied to regulations. Yet again, the amendment serves no other purpose than to facilitate households’ suits to obtain SNAP benefits and would be rendered
surplusage were courts to disallow those suits. Note also that 7 U.S.C. § 2020(a)(3)(B)(ii)
specifically includes actions “to enforce any … regulations issued under this Act” among those
in which state agencies’ records may be accessed.
9

private rights of action under requirements of federal law that did not create
property rights, it has never rejected judicial enforceability under a statute that did.
B.

Federal Budget Process Laws Classify SNAP as a Program Giving
Eligible Households the Right to Sue for Benefits

Whether eligible households may sue to enforce provisions of the Food and
Nutrition Act is a matter of great importance to managing the federal budget. If
households could not enforce provisions of the Act judicially, Congress could
control spending simply by adding to or reducing annual appropriations. See
Alexander v. Polk, 750 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1984). On the other hand, households’
ability to secure the benefits the Act provides in court means that Congress must
regulate spending by adjusting the substantive terms of their entitlement. This distinction between “discretionary” programs – programs whose spending is
controlled by discretionary annual appropriations – and “mandatory” or “direct
spending” programs – those in which designated beneficiaries may sue to obtain
benefits without regard to the level of appropriations – applies across the entire
federal budget.6

6

“Mandatory spending includes entitlement authority (for example, the Food Stamp, Medicare,
and veterans’ pension programs), payment of interest on the public debt, and non-entitlements
such as payments to states from Forest Service receipts. By defining eligibility and setting the
benefit or payment rules, Congress controls spending for these programs indirectly rather than
directly through appropriations acts.” GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), A GLOSSARY OF
TERMS USED IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 66 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05734sp.pdf.
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Congress’s budgetary procedures control spending in discretionary programs
by capping the amounts those appropriations bills may provide each year. 2 U.S.C.
§§ 633(a)(3), (b), (f)(1), (2)(B), 642(a), 901. Controlling direct spending is more
complicated, requiring means of forcing its various committees to change the
detailed terms of entitlement programs. Id. §§ 632(a), 633(a)(1), (f)(1), (2)(A),
639, 641-645, 902.

To prevent members or committees from gaming these

procedures, the budget process statutes strictly separate discretionary programs and
those in which eligible individuals have judicially enforceable rights to benefits.7
Thus, the same focus on rights “couched in mandatory, rather than precatory,
terms”, Gonzaga, at 282; Blessing, at 341, that is pivotal to the Court’s recognition
of private rights of action is also vital to Congress in its budget procedures.
Congress has recognized unequivocally that the Food Stamp Program is a
direct spending program, i.e., that eligible households have the right to judicial
enforcement of the Act’s terms. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 defines
“entitlement authority” to mean “(A) the authority to make payments (including
loans and grants), the budget authority for which is not provided for in advance by
appropriations Acts, to any person or government if, under the provisions of the
law containing that authority, the United States is obligated to make such payments
7

If it did not, appropriators could pretend to save money by cutting the appropriations to a direct
spending program, confident that the courts would honor the claimants’ entitlements and restore
their benefits. Alternatively, if committees tasked with cutting direct spending were allowed to
substitute legislation narrowing eligibility in a discretionary program, they could “cut” benefits
that are authorized in statute but that have never been provided due to a lack of appropriations.
11

to persons or governments who meet the requirements established by the law; and
(B) the food stamp program.”8 2 U.S.C. § 622(9). Similarly, the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 defines “direct spending” as “(A)
budget authority provided by law other than appropriations Acts; (B) entitlement
authority; and (C) the food stamp program.” Id. § 900(c)(8). It goes on to state
that “[a]s used in this part, all references to entitlement authority shall include the
list of mandatory appropriations included in the joint explanatory statement of
managers accompanying the conference report on the Balanced Budget Act of
1997.” Id. § 900(c)(17). That conference report lists food stamps among the
“appropriated entitlements and mandator[y]” programs. H. Conf. Rep. No. 105217, at 1014 (1997), reprinted at 1997 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 176, 635.
Here again, Congress has explicitly recognized that the Food and Nutrition
Act is privately enforceable. Nothing in the Supreme Court’s decisions even hints
at a basis for disregarding such unambiguous congressional intent. If the courts
denied eligible households the right to obtain the benefits that the Act provides,
they would open up a huge loophole in congressional budget enforcement
procedures by converting SNAP into a discretionary program while budget proce8

Although annual appropriations bills do include money for food stamps and some other direct
spending programs, GAO notes that “because the entitlement is created by operation of law, if
Congress does not appropriate the money necessary to fund the payments, eligible recipients may
have legal recourse.” GAO, at 13. Designating SNAP as an “entitlement” means that Congress
has determined that “under the provisions of the law containing such authority, the U.S.
government is legally required to make the payments to persons or governments that meet the
requirements established by law”. GAO, at 47.
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dures still treat it as a mandatory.

This would allow committees to evade

requirements to cut entitlements by manipulating SNAP.

If SNAP is to be

converted to a discretionary program, Congress, not the courts, should make that
decision.
III.

Legislative History Confirms that Congress Intended to Permit Judicial
Enforcement of the Food and Nutrition Act
The statutory provisions quoted above fully resolve the question. Lest there

be any doubt that Congress meant what it said, the legislative history amply
confirms this result. The House Agriculture Committee’s report on the Food
Stamp Act of 1977 states that: “[t]he administrative remedies against the state contained in section 11(f) and elsewhere should not be construed as abrogating in any
way private causes of action against states for failure to comply with federal
statutory or regulatory requirements.”

H. Rep. No. 95-464, at 398 (1977),

reprinted at 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1978, 2327. The Senate report on
the same legislation similarly declared that its granting USDA enforcement tools
“does not abrogate private causes of action against States for failure to comply
with Federal statutory or regulatory requirements.” S. Rep. No. 95-180, at 152
(1977).
Numerous committee reports include copious commentary on households’
suits to enforce the Act and its implementing regulations. See, e.g., S. Rep. No.
100-397, at 29 (1988); H. Rep. No. 99-271, at 147 (1985); S. Rep. No. 97-128, at
13

65-66 (1981); H. Rep. No. 96-788, at 98, 105, 135, 144 (1980); H. Rep. No. 96264, at 26 (1979); H. Rep. No. 95-464, at 26-28, 31-32, 35, 70-77, 92, 96, 120,
128, 137, 139-41, 144, 146, 247, 269, 271, 277, 278, 283-84, 343-44 (1977).
Sometimes the committee agrees with the results, sometimes it criticizes them on
the merits, but it never questions the propriety of the suits being brought. Congress
repeatedly has resolved issues then under litigation without expressing any concern
about that litigation’s legitimacy. Compare, e.g., H. Rep. No. 101-569, at 850,
853, 856 (1990); H. Rep. No. 99-271, at 142-43 (1985), with Wilson v. Lyng, 856
F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1988); Blinzinger v. Lyng, 834 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1987); Burkett
v. USDA, 764 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1985); Caples v. Yeutter, 721 F. Supp. 1065 (D.
Minn. 1989). Senators from both parties have explicitly identified households’
suits as desirable means of resolving problems with the program. E.g., 134 Cong.
Rec. S9857, S9867 (daily ed. July 26, 1988).
Unlike the statutes under which the Supreme Court has found no enforceable
private rights, Congress wrote the Food Stamp Act of 1977 expressly to replace the
“open-ended” terms of prior law “with a specific scheme” identifying which
household have the right to benefits, thus eliminating “discretion within the
parameters of Congressional goals”. H. Rep. No. 95-464, at 18-19 (1977). Where
Congress sought to regulate only states’ aggregate performance, rather than to
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provide rights to particular individuals, it did so explicitly. E.g., 7 U.S.C. §§
2016(e), 2025(c), 2035(e); see 7 C.F.R. § 276.2(b)(4).
More recently, the legislative history of the 2008 Farm Bill confirms that
Congress intended the amendments discussed above as responses both to
Almendarez and Reynolds specifically and to the courts’ increasing tendency to
question the private enforceability of public benefit program rules more generally.
Senator Durbin, a senior member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, made clear
that the Farm Bill’s provisions mean what they say, framing the issue in terms of
the Court’s test in Gonzaga:
Mr. President, I rise to address the importance of the nutrition assistance title of the farm bill. The bill goes a long way toward ensuring that
families in America will have food on their table, even when times are
tough. The bill also clarifies that their rights to certain nutrition services are
enforceable.
Sections 4116 through 4118 of the bill specifically reinforce Congress’s longstanding intention that the Food Stamp Act’s provisions and its
regulations are fully enforceable and should be enforced. The courts have
historically and correctly understood Congress’s intent that low-income
households have the right to enforce these provisions.
The language of the Food Stamp Act and its implementing regulations—parts 271, 272, 273, and so on—have the kind of clear language required for judicial enforcement. We made sure that they are mandatory, not
aspirational, and that they set out requirements for how each individual is to
be treated, not general program-wide goals. They clearly define the benefited class as low-income people receiving or seeking food assistance.
Nothing in the act or regulations suggests that substantial compliance overall
excuses denying any individual the benefit of these rules.
Along with oversight by the Department of Agriculture, lawsuits by
families participating in food stamps are one of the ways we can ensure the
Food Stamp Program fulfills its purpose. Indeed, it is partly because applicants and recipients can and do bring lawsuits to enforce program rules that
15

the Department has not been required to withhold funds from States to
enforce service standards in the program.
This legislation also makes explicit that various civil rights laws are
binding in the Food Stamp Program. This is not a change—these laws and
their regulations have applied since they were written, and both have been
intended to be fully enforceable. This legislation just reiterates a point that
we hope and believe was already clear.
None of this would have been a question until two recent, unfortunate
court decisions. The first case, Reynolds, comes from the Second Circuit. It
applied a standard of analysis that departed from all prior Federal court precedent and held that applicants and recipients could hold a state accountable
for the maladministration of the program by local food stamp agencies only
in the rarest of circumstances. The act is and has been clear that States are
responsible for full compliance with all applicable regulations. States’ responsibility is no less because they have chosen to have counties or other
local agencies operate the program for them. The option of local administration exists only as a courtesy or convenience to the States, not to reduce their
accountability. The State is just as responsible for what the local agency
does as if the State agency performed those acts itself. This legislation emphasizes that point.
In the other case, called Almendarez, a Federal district court refused
to consider a suit brought by low-income people who need assistance in a
language other than English to apply for food stamps. The Department’s
regulations clearly provide rights for families that need language assistance.
Now the act explicitly confirms that those regulations are enforceable.
Future cases can be decided on the merits, as they should be.
This bipartisan legislation goes a long way toward providing food for
working families, and providing the security of knowing that help is
enforceable by law. I thank the chairman and the committee for their
tremendous work.
154 Cong. Rec. S4747-48 (daily ed. May 22, 2008).
Representative Berman, the Ranking Majority Member of the House
Judiciary Committee, showed how the Act met the Gonzaga standard for private
enforceability:
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More broadly, the legislation recognizes that lawsuits by individual
households or classes of household to enforce their rights under the act and
regulations are an important part of the program. There now should be no
doubt, if there ever was any, that all provisions of the act and regulations
that help individuals get food assistance, or that protect them from burdens
in their pursuit of food aid, are intended to create enforceable rights, with
corrective injunctions or back benefits, the latter subject to the limitations in
the act, as appropriate.
The act does not require States or the Department only to exercise
reasonable efforts or to substantially comply with its requirements and those
in the regulations: it gives each individual a right to be treated as the act and
rules provide. The act and regulations have an unmistakable focus on the
benefited class of participants and prospective participants, they are written
in mandatory, not precatory terms, and they are concerned with the treatment
of individuals as much as they are with aggregate or system-wide
performance.
I cannot imagine how Congress could be any clearer in this regard. I
anticipate that we will have no further confusion concerning the
enforceability of the act and regulations.
Id. at H3819 (daily ed. May 14, 2008).
Senate Agriculture Committee Chairman Harkin made explicit what
statutory language and legislative history have long demonstrated – that members
of Congress have legislated on the assumption that eligible households could sue to
secure benefits under the Act:
I have been a member of the Senate Agriculture Committee or the
House Agriculture Committee for over 30 years. I have always operated on
the assumption that the act and regulations create enforceable rights for
actual and prospective participants and that litigation may properly arise
under provisions of either. When I have heard of examples where applicants
or clients were not provided with the service that the act and rules provide,
such as timely and fair service, assistance for those who need it by the State
agency or 10 days to turn in requested paperwork, I have supported the right
of an individual to file a claim against the State to enforce the rules established by Congress and the regulations stemming from the statute.
17

Id. at S4752-53 (daily ed. May 22, 2008).

Senator Harkin also applied the

Gonzaga standard to identify which provisions of the Act are designed to create
judicially-enforceable individual rights and which speak in precatory terms or seek
to benefit the program as a whole rather than any individual households:
With very few exceptions, the old Food Stamp Act and the new Food
and Nutrition Act are based on the principle of individual rights. Much of
that stems from a history in the 1960s and 1970s of clients not being able to
gain access to the program. To be sure, section 2 has little in it to enforce:
subsections (a) through (g) of section 7 do not affect individual households,
and sections 9, 10, 12, and 15 focus on retailers and wholesalers. Within
section 11, paragraphs (e)(19), (e)(20), (e)(22), and (e)(23), as well as
subsections (f) through (h), (k), (l), (n) through I, and (t), regulate state
agencies rather than households. The same is true in section 16 of the
beginning of subsection (a) as well as of subsections (c), (d), and (f) through
(k). Sections 14(a), 18(e) and (f), 19, 23, 25, and 27 similarly do not convey
rights to households. A few other provisions by their terms no longer apply
to anyone. But by and large, the Agriculture Committees, and Congress as a
whole, have consistently intended that the Food Stamp Program be
administered in strict conformity with the Food Stamp Act and with
regulations the Secretary has duly promulgated under this act and that
prospective and actual participants be entitled to enforce these provisions
legally.
Id.
Representative Baca, Chairman of the House Nutrition Subcommittee, made
explicit that section 4118 of the Farm Bill sought to override Almendarez:
Recently, a district court in Ohio dismissed a case brought against the State
to enforce the Department’s regulations for serving people whose primary
language is not English. I can’t speak to whether the case had any merit, but
my colleagues and I were surprised and disturbed to learn about the court’s
dismissal. We felt that it was critical to clarify in this bill that it has always
been Congress’s intent that the program’s regulations should be fully
18

enforceable and fully complied with to the same extent as the statute. The
farm bill, therefore, clarifies that the Department’s rules on serving non- and
limited-English speaking people have the force of law and create rights for
households.
Id., at H3814 (daily ed. May 14, 2008). Representative Berman echoed this view
and also noted the overruling of Reynolds:
As a senior member of the Judiciary Committee, I am particularly
pleased to see this title includes language to correct a couple of problems
that have arisen relating to the enforceability of the act and to ensure that no
further problems exist.
The Food Stamp Act has long been recognized as fully enforceable on
behalf of active and prospective participants. This history of enforceability is
comparable to that of securities regulations, which the courts have long
accepted. When, many years ago, a panel of the Fifth Circuit found no
private right of action under the Food Stamp Act in a case brought by a pro
se plaintiff, several other circuits, and ultimately the Fifth Circuit en banc,
rejected that conclusion. Had they not done so, I have no doubt we would
have intervened.
Recently, a couple of Federal courts cast doubt on this long-held
principle, one by finding the Department’s regulations on bilingual service
unenforceable and another by forcing plaintiffs to meet the high standards
for supervisory liability when suing a State to enforce the act and regulations
against local agencies. I am pleased that this legislation overrules both of
those decisions.
Id., at H3819. Senator Harkin described the overriding of both cases that had
questioned the private enforceability of the Food Stamp Act and regulations:
Throughout the history of the Food Stamp Program, the courts have
played a positive, constructive role in ensuring that congressional intent is
carried out. The program has not been overrun with litigation because both
Congress, in writing statutes, and USDA, in writing regulations, have taken
great pains to be clear and specific. On those rare occasions when courts
have misunderstood our intent on an important matter, Congress has amended that statute accordingly. Because USDA keeps the Agriculture Committees closely apprised of its regulatory actions, Congress also has been com19

fortable with—indeed supportive of—litigation to enforce the Department’s
regulations. On numerous occasions when we leave a matter open in the
statute, it is because USDA has told us exactly how it plans to address the
matter in regulations. Congress has always operated on the assumption, and
with the intent, that the program’s regulations would be fully enforceable
and fully complied with to the same extent as the statute.
I was disturbed to learn of two recent cases in which courts disregarded the longstanding history of judicial enforcement of the act and regulations. A district court in Ohio refused to entertain a suit brought to enforce
the Department’s regulations for serving people whose primary language is
not English, and an appellate court in New York held that States are less responsible for compliance with the act and regulations when the program is
administered by local governments than when the State administers the program itself.
Accordingly, this legislation clarifies that States must comply with the
Department’s rules on service to non-English-speaking households as well
as with the statute. The regulations, no less than the statute, create rights for
households to ensure that they can receive benefits.
Responding to the New York case, the legislation clarifies that States’
responsibility is no less in locally administered systems. Congress has
granted States the option for local administration as a convenience; nothing
in the law reduces States’ responsibility if they take this option. If the State
could not be held fully accountable for strict compliance with the act and
regulations in these cases, local administration would not be permitted.
These amendments correct that problem.
Id., at S4752-53 (daily ed. May 22, 2008).
Finally, as discussed above, not only did the 2008 Farm Bill overrule the
only two cases limiting the availability of a private right of action to enforce the
statute, it also clarified the private enforceability of SNAP regulations in light of
Sandoval. Representative Baca declared that
Another important achievement of the bill is to ensure that both Federal
statute and regulations have the full force of law, ensuring that clients who
do not receive adequate service under these rules and standards may bring
suit. … Beyond the issue of bilingual access rules, this legislation makes
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clear that the Department’s civil rights regulations are among those which
have the full force of law and which households have the right to enforce.
Discrimination is not acceptable in any form or at any point in the food
stamp certification process. Households should not be assisted, or not assisted, approved or denied for any reason other than an individual assessment
of their need for help or their eligibility by the state. I am pleased to be
playing a role in making clear that the Committee and the Congress wish the
program to be administered in compliance with the Food Stamp Act and its
regulations.
Id., at H3814 (daily ed. May 14, 2008).
IV.

The Authoritative Administrative Construction Recognizes a Private
Right of Action
Longstanding USDA regulations, which are due some deference, recognize

that the Act and its regulations are privately enforceable. They require states to report such suits to USDA and to facilitate USDA’s intervention where important issues of national policy are at stake. 7 C.F.R. § 272.4(d). USDA under both Democratic and Republican administrations has participated in numerous such suits over
the years as an original defendant, as a third-party defendant, or as a defendantintervener. It does not ever appear to have questioned the availability of a private
right of action.
V. The Court’s En Banc Decision in Victorian v. Miller Controls This Case
Victorian v. Miller, 813 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), unanimously
overruled a prior panel decision, Tyler v. Pasqua, 748 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1984), to
find that food stamp applicants may sue to enforce 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9), one of
the two statutes at issue here. Victorian held that 7 U.S.C. § 2023(b) explicitly
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authorizes households to bring suit to enforce the Act. Victorian also relied on the
Supreme Court’s holding in Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985), “that foodstamp benefits ‘are a matter of statutory entitlement’” Id., at 721. Victorian
controls this case unless the Court reconsiders it en banc.
“Without a clearly contrary opinion of the Supreme Court or of this court
sitting en banc, [a panel] cannot overrule a decision of a prior panel of this court.”
Bd. of Supervisors v. Smack Apparel Co,, 550 F.3d 465, 488 (5th Cir. 2008)
(emphasis in the original); Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573, 577 (5th Cir.
2001) (“a panel of this court can only overrule a prior panel decision if such
overruling is unequivocally directed by controlling Supreme Court precedent.”).
“This principle applies a fortiori [where the prior case] is an en banc decision.”
United States v. Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 151 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525
U.S. 878 (1998).
Equal Access for El Paso v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 704 (5th Cir. 2007),
held that Gonzaga implicitly overruled prior decisions finding implied private
rights of action based on the presumption of private enforceability that the
Supreme Court had rejected. By contrast, nothing in Gonzaga is inconsistent with
Victorian’s finding of an express private right of action because “Congress …
amended the Act to provide guidelines for judicial enforcement of the Act through
private actions” under 7 U.S.C. § 2023(b). Victorian, at 723-24. Nor does it call
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into question Victorian’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins: the
interests asserted in Gonzaga, Blessing, and Suter had never been held to be
statutory entitlements.

The mere fact that the Supreme Court has begun to

interpret other statutes more narrowly does not allow a panel to reopen a prior
decision about a particular act. Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intelligence Ctr., 548 F.3d
375, 378 (5th Cir. 2008). It is insufficient that this Court’s “approach arguably
conflicts with” or “may be in tension with” Supreme Court decisions. Encore
Videos, Inc. v. San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540
U.S. 982 (2003).
Victorian is consistent with the explicit holdings of other circuits. Gonzalez
v. Pingree, 821 F. 2d 1526, 1528, 1530 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding that the Act
“speaks in imperative, not merely permissive, terms mandating that state agencies”
meet its application processing deadlines and that section 7 U.S.C. § 2023(b)
“plainly contemplates enforcement through individual lawsuits”); Haskins v.
Stanton, 794 F.2d 1273, 1275 (7th Cir. 1986); cf., Robinson, 869 F.2d at 210 n. 9
(noting that section 2023(b) sets a “one-year limitations for commencing
proceedings”). District courts, too, have found that households may sue to enforce
the Act and its implementing regulations. Williston v. Eggleston, 379 F. Supp. 2d
561 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Dubuque v. Yeutter, 728 F. Supp. 303 (D. Vt. 1989), rev’d
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on other grounds, 917 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1990); Quinones v. Coler, 651 F. Supp.
1028 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Harley v. Lyng, 653 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
More broadly, Victorian conforms to the long-accepted understanding of the
Act by Congress, USDA, and the courts. Prior to Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1
(1980), numerous federal courts entertained food stamp applicants and recipients
suits to enforce the Food Stamp Acts of 1964 and 1977, explicitly or implicitly
finding a private right of action directly under the statute. E.g., Knebel v. Hein,
429 U.S. 288 (1977); Jacquet v. Westerfield, 569 F.2d 1339 (5th Cir. 1978);
Anderson v. Butz, 550 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1977); Harrelson v. Butz, 547 F.2d 915
(4th Cir. 1977); Madden v. Oklahoma, 523 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1975); Tyson v.
Maher, 523 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1975); Bermudez v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 490 F.2d
718 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1104 (1973); Carter v. Butz, 479 F.2d
1084 (3d Cir. 1973), cert denied 414 U.S. 1094 (1973); Stewart v. Butz, 356 F.
Supp. 1345 (W.D. Ky. 1973), aff’d 491 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1974). Since Thiboutot,
numerous federal courts have heard and decided applicants’ and recipients’
assertions of both direct private rights of action and their suits under section 1983.
E.g., Atkins, at 124-27; Stone v. Hamilton, 308 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2002); Walton v.
Hammonds, 192 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 1999); Estey v. Comm’r, Dep’t of Human Res.,
21 F.3d 1198 (1st Cir. 1994); Robertson v. Jackson, 972 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1992);
Hamilton v. Madigan, 961 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1992); West v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 1122
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(3d Cir. 1988); Murray v. Lyng, 854 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1988); Foster v. Celani,
849 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1988); Gonzalez; Klaips v. Bergland, 715 F.2d 477 (10th Cir.
1983); Antone v. Block, 661 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Roberts v. Austin, 632 F.2d
1202 (5th Cir. 1980).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court should be reversed and the case
remanded for a determination on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
______________________________
David A. Super
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